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Abstract: 
In 2014, the Court of Appeal considered if pay equity was also protected under the Act. In this paper I 
analyse and critique that decision. It seeks to answer two fundamental questions about the case and wider 
issues surrounding pay equity. First, it asks whether a mandate does exist under the Act requiring the 
provision of pay equity. Is the Act restricted to a narrow pay equality interpretation, or is it wide enough to 
encapsulate pay equity? The conclusion will be reached that little light is shed on the position of pay equity 
from an interpretation of the statute. Both the inclusion and exclusion of pay equity remain open 
interpretations. A realist explanation will argue a policy decision, in the absence of an interpretative answer, 
is driving factor of the Court of Appeal’s findings.  
The second question looks to the natural continuation of the current case and asks what should be the 
avenue through which pay equity is pursued. This is a normative inquiry. Litigation will be considered under 
both a traditional and strategic approach. The alternate solutions of a legislative and an unregulated market 
will also be investigates. It will be argued that judicial inclusion of pay equity under the Equal Pay Act is 
undesirable. Instead, dedicated legislation would prove the most effective means of achieving pay equity. 
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I Introduction 
 
New Zealand has had a long history of promoting and protecting the rights of women. The 
first country with suffrage for women, and the first to have the highest governing offices 
simultaneously filled by women.1 These achievements are embedded in the national 
memory and New Zealand views itself as world leader in the area of women’s rights.2 
However, these instances do not represent a complete victory over gender discrimination. 
Amongst others, pay disparity remains a live issue today. The gender pay gap in New 
Zealand has remained around 10 per cent for the last five years.3 Disparity in pay is the 
result of many complex, and often intertwined, factors. Social structure, equality of 
opportunity and discrimination all contribute to the gap.4 
Under New Zealand legislation pay equality is expressly protected in the Equal Pay Act 
1972 (the Act). There must be equal pay for equal work.5 However, disparity can still exist 
where there is equality. In 2014, the Court of Appeal considered if pay equity was also 
protected under the Act.6 Equity requires equal pay for work of equal value. The Court 
found that pay equity fitted within the scope of the Act.7 The Court also gave general 
direction towards the criteria to be applied when assessing a potentially discriminatory rate 
of remuneration.8 
In this paper I analyse and critique that decision. I seek to answer two fundamental 
questions about the case and wider issues surrounding pay equity. First, I ask whether a 
mandate does exist under the Act requiring the provision of pay equity. Is the Act 
restricted to a narrow pay equality interpretation, or is it wide enough to encapsulate pay 
equity? This question is answered by embarking on an exercise in statutory interpretation. 
The generally accepted method of statutory interpretation is identified and analysed against 
the process of the Court of Appeal. The conclusion will be reached that little light is shed 
                                                          
1    “Famous Firsts” History Group of the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage  
<www.nzhistory.net.nz/>; and “Silvia Cartwright becomes governor-general” History Group of the 
New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage <www.nzhistory.net.nz/>. 
2    “New Zealand women” Ministry for Women <women.govt.nz/>. 
3  “Gender pay gap” Ministry for Women <http://women.govt.nz/> 
4  Towards Employment Equity: Report of the Working Group on Equal Employment Opportunities  
and Equal Pay (Working Group on Equal Opportunities and Equal Pay, June 1988) at 11. 
5  Equal Pay Act 1972, s 3. 
6  Terranova Homes & Care Ltd v Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc [2014]  
NZCA 516, [2015] 2 NZLR 437. 
7  At [237].  
8  At [147] and [174].  
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on the position of pay equity from an interpretation of the statute. Both the inclusion and 
exclusion of pay equity remain open interpretations. A realist explanation will show a 
policy decision, in the absence of an interpretative answer, is driving factor of the Court of 
Appeal’s findings.  
The second question looks to the natural continuation of the current case and asks what 
avenue should be now used to pursue pay equity. This is a normative inquiry. Both the 
ability and appropriateness of the courts to provide for pay equity will be questioned. 
Litigation will be considered under both a traditional and strategic approach. The alternate 
solutions of a legislative response and an unregulated market will also be investigated. It 
will be argued that judicial inclusion of pay equity under the Equal Pay Act is undesirable. 
Instead, dedicated legislation would prove the most effective means of achieving pay 
equity. 
 
II Basis of the Claim and Procedural History 
 
Terranova v Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota is the most recent decision 
in a line of cases beginning with a claim lodged with the Employment Relations 
Authority.9 This claim was brought by Ms Kristine Bartlett, an aged-care worker. Her 
claim is that her employer, Terranova, is not providing her a rate of pay consistent with the 
requirements under the Equal Pay Act. She argues that the entire aged-care sector is paid 
less because it is dominated by women.10 
The Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota, of which Ms Bartlett is a member, 
brought a similar claim seeking a general statement from the Employment Court about the 
general principles involved in implementing equal pay.11 Because of the potentially wide-
reaching implications of this case, the Employment Court considered both claims and 
answered six preliminary questions of law.12 The Court of Appeal was then asked to 
review the answers to questions one and six.13 Question one asks what factors the courts 
                                                          
9  Bartlett v Terranova Homes and Care Ltd [2012] NZERA Wellington 141.  
10  At [3].  
11  Service and Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc v  Terranova Homes and Care Ltd [2013]  
NZEmpC 157, [2013] ERNZ 504. 
12  At [118].  
13  See Appendix One 
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can consider when determining if there is a discriminatory rate of pay. Question six looks 
to the boundaries of relevant evidence for finding a discriminatory rate. Together, both the 
questions are asking what is the scope of the Equal Pay Act 1972. Is it capable of 
providing for pay equity? It is the appeal of these questions to the Court of Appeal that is 
the subject of this paper. 
The scope of the Equal Pay Act is of crucial importance to the issue before the courts. If 
the Act is limited to providing for equal pay then the claims cannot proceed. However, if 
the Act is wide enough to allow for pay equity then the claim can proceed to a factual 
determination. Ensuring a mandate for pay equity exists is an exercise in statutory 
interpretation. It is not a straightforward task. The 1975 report into the progress of equal 
pay instigated by the Minister of Labour described the section in question as, “the most 
difficult [section] to interpret.”14 This is section 3. Section 3 sets out the criteria for 
determining if an element of discrimination exists in a rate of remuneration. 
 
III Interpretation of the Equal Pay Act 1972 
 
While the public interest in this case lies with its treatment of pay equity, the Court’s 
decision is essentially an exercise in statutory interpretation. The interpretation of the 
statute is the determinative factor in the progression of the claim. How the Court 
approached the exercise is therefore vital in any analysis of the case. This analysis must be 
grounded in an understanding of the nature and accepted methodology of statutory 
interpretation. The Court of Appeal’s approach can then be compared and analysed against 
this yardstick. 
Statutory interpretation is far from being devoid of contention. There is debate surrounding 
the scope, nature and theoretical underpinning of the task set for the courts.15 However, 
messiness and multiplicity in method is not a unique phenomenon within the law.16 The 
experience of law, in common law jurisdictions, is not that of a code rigidly applied 
                                                          
14  Progress of Equal Pay in New Zealand (A Committee appointed by the Minister of Labour, October  
1975) at 32. 
15  Randal Graham Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Emond Montgomery Publications  
Limited, Toronto, 2001) at 1. 
16  Ross Carter and Jason McHerron Statutory Interpretation – a 2012 guide (New Zealand Law  
Society, October 2012) at 5. 
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without input from the adjudicator. Law generally, as with statutory interpretation, is not 
capable of scientific precision. Rather, it can be seen as an art form capable of dealing with 
discretion and variation. Carter and McHerron show that statutory interpretation is 
therefore able to operate effectively within the muddled theoretical context.17 The borders 
of interpretation have been marked and a generally accepted practice has been developed 
by the courts. This approach will frame the analysis of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. 
 
A Accepted Method of Statutory Interpretation 
 
1 Text 
 
The starting point for an investigation into interpreting legislation is the text of the statute 
itself.18  Section 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 1999 highlights the primacy of text, 
requiring the meaning of an enactment to be deduced from the text in light of its 
meaning.19 The text sets the boundaries of meanings that are open to interpretation so that 
“purpose is constrained by text.”20 A solely text based approach was evident at the genesis 
of statutory interpretation.21 However, Graham argues that textualism per se let a 
“darkness spread across the face of the law.22 A textual approach is therefore only the 
starting point for an interpretive exercise. Parliament has spoken through the statutory 
language. However, pure reliance on this may not provide a conclusion due to ambiguous, 
vague and imprecise wording.23 A strict interpretation also has the potential to subvert the 
legislative purpose. A further step is therefore required in the process of statutory 
interpretation. 
 
2 Purpose 
 
                                                          
17  At 4.  
18  Sir Rupert Cross, John Bell and Sir George Eagle Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed, Butterworths,  
London, 1995) at 49. 
19  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1).  
20  Carter and McHerron, above n 16, at 28.  
21  Graham, above n 15, at 1. 
22  At 1.  
23  Colin Manchester and David Salter Exploring the Law: The Dynamics of Precedent and Statutory  
Interpretation (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006) at 105. 
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Ascertaining the legislative purpose has become this second step. Just as text constraints 
purpose, purpose enlarges the text.24 The legislative purpose gives colour to the statutory 
wording. While the purposive approach has become an important part of statutory 
interpretation, it remains subservient to text as noted in s 5(1) of the Interpretation Act 
1999. A balance must be reached between text and purpose. Application of the legislative 
purpose must not go so far as to push the meaning outside of that which is capable on the 
wording. However, as mentioned, text must be viewed in light of the target of the 
legislation to prevent the frustration of Parliament.25 Purpose can be extracted from a 
variety of materials. Often the most authoritative statement of purpose will be an internal 
express description made through purpose provisions.26  
 
3 Context and values 
 
Textualism and purpose are the key drivers of statutory interpretation. However, the courts 
have also found it useful to refer to context, both internal and external, and the values to be 
drawn from other statutes and international agreements.27 
Text does not exist in isolation. Surrounding text provides context from which meaning 
can be drawn. Extrinsic aids can also act as useful pointers. These include materials 
relating to legislative history, section seven reports and other existing law including 
common law.28 
In this paper I argue the contextual analysis may extend beyond the temporal bounds set 
under an orthodox approach to statutory interpretation. The orthodoxy states that context 
and extrinsic aids can only be relevant before the enactment of the legislation.29 To 
attribute meaning to materials after the fact subverts the idea that meaning and purpose of 
the legislation is that created by Parliament. However, there is already one accepted 
exception to this position. Subsequent legislation can be considered to maintain harmony 
in the statute book.30 It is argued a further exception should exist. Clear and consistent 
government practice in administering an Act can be useful to discovering meaning, 
                                                          
24  Carter and McHerron, above n 16, at 28. 
25  At 29.  
26  At 39.   
27  At 133 to 134.  
28  At 72.  
29  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [193].  
30  Carter and McHerron, above n 16, at 73. 
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particularly where an ambiguity exists. Consideration of government practice should be 
open to the courts. This proposition has support from Carter and McHerron.31 
Values and obligations under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi and international instruments can be used by courts when interpreting statutes. 
Reference to these materials is justified through presumptions recognised by the courts. 
The courts presume that Parliament does not intend to legislate inconsistently with the 
Treaty, the Bill of Rights or international obligations.32 It is presumed Parliament will not 
ratify an international agreement until it is compliant.33 These presumptions are not 
indefeasible. An express parliamentary intention to the contrary will remove the 
presumption. 
 
B Court of Appeal’s Analysis and Critique 
 
Statutory interpretation is the result of some failing in the relevant statute. The legislation 
is imprecise or fails speak to all eventualities. However, formulating statutes without such 
defects is as desirable as it is unrealistic.  The key problem with interpreting the Equal Pay 
Act in this case is ambiguity. It is unclear whether the Act caters for pay equity or whether 
it is limited to providing for pay equality. The Court of Appeal applied much of the 
accepted statutory interpretation process. Each aspect of the interpretation is laid out and 
analysed. 
1 Text 
 
The Court of Appeal’s first focus was the statutory text. First, the Court noted that s 3(1) is 
separated out into two categories in paragraphs (a) and (b).34 Paragraph (a) sets out the 
criteria to be applied when work is not exclusively or predominantly performed by female 
employees. Paragraph (b) then sets out the criteria for work performed predominantly or 
exclusively by women. The Court viewed the creation of this distinction as suggesting 
something wider than strict pay equality was intended at the drafting stage.35 When work 
is predominantly or exclusively performed by females there is potential for pay inequity. 
                                                          
31  At 85.   
32  At 107, 108 and 112.   
33  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [227]. 
34  At [98].  
35  At [102]. 
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Pay equality is an unlikely, though not impossible, claim as the usual argument is that the 
entire workforce has been discriminately undervalued due to its gender imbalance. The 
distinction therefore seems amenable to a wide interpretation by acknowledging two 
different circumstances where discrimination can exist. 
The Court identified a further argument in favour of the Act being widely stated.36 This is 
the placement of the criteria for work predominantly performed by women. This could 
have been situated in either paragraph in s 3(1). Work that is not dominated by a female 
workforce is unlikely to be subject to an equity claim. Pay equality is what will be argued 
under the first paragraph. Men are doing the same work in such industries and therefore if 
discrimination exists a claim can be brought on an equality basis. If work that is 
predominantly performed by women had been placed in this first category the likely 
implication is that only pay equality could be brought for this category. Work performed 
exclusively by women would have, out of necessity, been placed in its own paragraph. Pay 
equality is not possible when no men do the same work. Therefore, the Court 
acknowledged the inclusion of work largely performed by women, with that which is 
exclusive to women, gives an indication something more than equality is intended in 
paragraph (b).37 
The Court of Appeal also noted that the drafting is of a poor standard.38 It is ambiguous 
and uses circular reasoning at times. The Court relied upon this lack of precision to defeat 
arguments that the use of definite articles confined the Act to comparisons of the same 
work.39 However, the Court did not question the standard of drafting relating to the 
construction of s 3. The aforementioned textual indications in favour of a wider meaning 
were not subject to the same scepticism of drafting. By undercutting the quality of the 
drafting in certain areas it seems to weaken the strength of any textual arguments made. 
A textual argument, in favour of a wide reading, remains. This was not considered or 
identified by the Court. This regards the criteria in paragraphs (a) and (b). The criteria for 
work performed predominantly by women and the criteria for work without a gender 
imbalance is the same in all but one instance. Work that is not exclusively or 
predominantly performed by women has an extra requirement in determining if 
                                                          
36  At [101].  
37  At [101].  
38  At [146].  
39  At [146].  
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discrimination exists. The evidence of higher wages must come from the same work or 
class of work.40 This constraint is not imposed for work that is performed largely by 
women. If it was, it would likely prove fatal to any attempt to claim inequity. Equity 
claims argue that the entire sector has been undervalued and therefore inter-sector 
comparisons are needed. Therefore, not placing this constraint on paragraph (b) signals, at 
the very least, pay equity has not been prevented by the text of the Act. 
As demonstrated in the accepted method of statutory interpretation, text acts as a 
boundary. It constraints the extent to which purpose and context can operate. Here no 
boundaries are drawn. No clear distinction is made between equity and equality. There are 
tentative indications from the construction of the text that a wider meaning is possible. 
These indications go beyond those identified by the Court. However, the limitations of 
these signals must be recognised. There is nothing explicit and they must be weighted 
accordingly. 
 
2 Purpose and context  
 
The Court of Appeal then sought to uncover the legislative purpose.41 The purpose is the 
reason for the enactment of the Equal Pay Act. Deducing this purpose has the potential to 
resolve the ambiguity by colouring the statutory language. Several different materials were 
used in an attempt to draw out the legislation’s purpose. These were parliamentary debates, 
commissioned reports and subsequent legislation.  
While the purposive approach has taken its place in the generally accepted principles of 
statutory interpretation, there are aspects of ascertaining purpose that remain in a more 
tenuous position.42 The main debate surrounds the idea of parliamentary intent.43 
Parliamentary intent is the reasoning and motive attributed to House of Representatives in 
enacting the relevant piece of legislation. Parliamentary debates are often used as evidence 
of this intent.44 The debate on parliamentary intent is relevant to the discussion of the 
Court of Appeal’s analysis. The Court attempted to uncover parliamentary intent through 
                                                          
40  Equal Pay Act, s 3(1)(a).  
41  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [104]. 
42  Aharon Barak Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2005) at  
 30. 
43  At 30.  
44  Carter and McHerron, above n 16, at 97. 
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an investigation of the parliamentary debates.45 The leading opposition views the notion of 
‘parliamentary intent’ as an artificial construct. Proponents of this view argue that 
Parliament is institutionally incapable of forming intent.46 It is a body made up of many 
constituent parts and therefore cannot form a single mental state. The artificial product is 
to be valued more for its linguistic convenience than its depiction of reality.47 In response, 
Ekins has argued that Parliament is capable of forming an intention, in what he terms 
‘legislative intent’. He conceives that an intention is formed when legislators jointly act on 
a proposal.48 Through majority vote Parliament choses the proposal as one body.49 This 
view sits conceptually better with the constitutional role of Parliament. The majority of the 
body elects to take action by passing an Act of Parliament. In the current proceedings the 
Court acknowledged the capacity for Parliament to form intent.50 Parliamentary debates 
were examined for any enunciation of reason or intent. However, there was none. The 
Court found that the speeches failed to speak to the ambiguity.51 For the most part this is 
an accurate summation of the debates. The speeches engaged with the general idea of 
discriminatory rates of pay but did not examine the scope of the proposed remedy. 
However, there is one aberration. During the First Reading the Hon Hugh Watt, Deputy 
Leader of the Opposition, gives the clearest statement in favour of pay equity evident in 
the entire statutory interpretation exercise. “We welcome the introduction of a Bill that 
provides for equal pay for people doing equal work…”52 Equal work as opposed to the 
same work is the essence of any pay equity issue. This sentiment is not repeated at any 
stage in the parliamentary debates by Watt, nor is it evident in the speech of any other 
member. This raises a further aspect to the debate of parliamentary, or legislative, intent. 
Can Watt’s view be attributed to Parliament as a whole and form the intent from which the 
courts can deduce purpose? It asks whether the actions of one can inform the judicial 
understanding of the actions of the whole. Ekins argues it cannot.53 Individual motive is 
capable of being distinguished from the intent of the Legislature. The intent of the 
Legislature manifests when Parliament acts as a whole. Watt’s statements do not constitute 
                                                          
45  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [86]. 
46  Richard Ekins The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 5. 
47  At 5.  
48  At 231.  
49  At 230.  
50  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [86]. 
51  At [203]. 
52  (29 August 1972) 380 NZPD 2178. 
53  Ekins, above n 46, at 230.  
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the choice of Parliament to act on a proposal and instead should be viewed solely as the 
views of an individual. Therefore, from repeated judicial examination of parliamentary 
debates, the accepted method of statutory interpretation acknowledges the institutional 
competence of Parliament to form an intention.  Parliament has not formed an evidenced 
intention that distinguishes between equity and equality.  
The Court of Appeal continued its purposive investigation with the 1971 Commission of 
Inquiry report into equal pay.54 This report was the platform used to introduce the Equal 
Pay Bill into the House.55 The report did not attract much focus from the Court of Appeal. 
Within the report passages were identified at times supporting, and at other times rejecting, 
the inclusion of pay equity. This lack of consistency was the reason given for not engaging 
with the report more deeply. 56   
Inconsistent and ambiguous is a fair representation of the report. It is clear that the report 
advocated for pay equality but its intent towards pay equity is not so apparent. Equal pay is 
defined but not in a way that explicitly rules pay equity in or out.57 The Commission 
accepted that gender discrimination manifests in both pay inequality and inequity and 
acknowledged the premise of equal pay for work of equal value.58 However, 
acknowledging the problem exists does not mean the report recommended action to be 
taken. There is no explicit statement that pay equity should be addressed in any subsequent 
legislation. The Commission rejected the implementation of a universal job evaluation tool 
that assesses work on an objective basis.59 This type of assessment is commonly, though 
not exclusively, used in pay equity investigations.60 Therefore, the report does not clarify 
the purpose of the Act. The same substantive conclusion as the Court is reached. 
Perhaps a further unarticulated reason for not engaging in depth with the report is the 
nature of the information itself. Under an orthodox approach to statutory interpretation 
there is generally reluctance from the judiciary to investigate departmental and policy 
materials such as this report.61 However, in this paper I argue that there should be greater 
                                                          
54  Equal Pay in New Zealand (Commission of Inquiry, September 1971).  
55  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [18]. 
56  At [86].  
57  Equal Pay in New Zealand, above n 54, at 20.  
58  At 19.  
59  At 47.  
60  “Equitable Job Evaluation” Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment  
 <www.dol.govt.nz/>. 
61  Carter and McHerron, above n 16, at 96. 
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judicial engagement with this type of material due to the constitutional setting. The 
justification for the orthodox approach is that the locus of legislative power lies with 
parliament.62 Parliamentary intent cannot be found in departmental documentation. In a 
Westminster system, Parliament is giving the role of legislating. The formulation of policy 
is the purview of the Executive. However, in this constitutional set up the government 
holds a majority in the House of Representatives.63 The government, along with its 
coalition partners or allies, therefore has the potential to give effect to its policies directly. 
The input of the parliamentary process, particularly Select Committee, must not be 
overlooked. However, the department policy can remain a key driver in the enactment of 
legislation. It can be a rich source for illuminating the purpose of the legislation. The 
argument is that it can be artificial in certain cases to refer only to parliamentary intent. 
Where executive policy has been driven through the House it may be useful to recognise 
the departmental purpose. The implication of this argument is not that intent or purpose 
does not exist. Rather, that because the locus of that intent lies elsewhere, different 
materials may be relevant in determining this purpose. Greater judicial access to 
departmental and policy-based materials may be more useful to uncovering than those 
provided by Parliament. There are close links with the report and the Act with instances of 
recommended drafting being closely replicated in the statute. The policy and intent behind 
the report is therefore of direct relevance in ascertaining the purpose of the Act.  
An action that was carefully deliberated by the Court is the enactment of the Employment 
Equity Act 1990.64 The Court of Appeal did acknowledge that this factor weighed in 
favour of a narrow conception of the Equal Pay Act.65 The purpose of the 1990 Act was to 
provide for pay equity.66 It established the machinery for dealing with claims where work 
of equal value was not attracting an equal rate of remuneration. The purpose of enacting 
this statute is therefore directly relevant to the current inquiry. If the 1990 Act was seen as 
a novel step in providing for pay equity by Parliament then there is a strong implication 
that it was not provided for in the 1972 legislation. The Equal Pay Act is restricted to pay 
equality. However, if the 1990 Act was merely providing the machinery for the framework 
of its predecessor, or somehow augmenting the existing regime, then the wider conception 
is more appropriate. The Court of Appeal was correct to identify that the reports leading to 
                                                          
62  At 56.  
63  This may be a single-party majority, coalition or other governance agreement. 
64  Employment Equity Act 1990. 
65  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [198]. 
66  At [184].  
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the Act and the parliamentary materials themselves are inconclusive.67 Statements support 
both reasons for enacting the legislation. 
However, there is one report which is clear and should arguably have been given more 
weight by the Court. This report was entitled “Towards Employment Equity” and was 
produced by the Government Working Group on Equal Opportunities and Equal Pay.68 It 
was of the view that pay equity was not provided for in legislation as it stood in 1988. The 
report definitively states, “The Working Group agrees that the present Equal Pay Act 1972 
does not provide a remedy based upon a claim of equal pay for work of equal value.”69 
This report deserves to be given significant weight. Part Two of the report proposes draft 
legislation to be enacted to address the pay equity problem.70 The suggested drafting is a 
close representation of what was enacted in the 1990 Act. The three parts bear identical 
titles and the broad approach is the same. It is clear the report played a large role in 
producing the Employment Equity Act 1990. From a variety of reports since the 1972 Act 
there is a general consensus that something more is needed for pay equity to be 
remedied.71 The reports work on the assumption that further legislative intervention is 
necessary. 
The orthodox position is that occurrences after the passage of an Act do not affect its 
meaning.72 This includes the formation of a generally held working understanding of how 
the Act operated. As has been argued, an exception to the orthodoxy should exist where 
government practice and working knowledge has been built upon a particular 
understanding. This is particularly desirable where ambiguity persists. The working 
understanding of the Act which has been generally accepted for four decades, evidenced 
by the enactment of the 1990 Act, should be given weight. The current proceedings are the 
biggest challenge designed to test that working assumption. 
Purpose and context have been intertwined in this analysis. The Court of Appeal mainly 
attempted to deduce the purpose through the employment of extrinsic contextual aids 
                                                          
67  At [186].  
68  Towards Employment Equity, above n 4.   
69  At 15.  
70  At 25.   
71  Towards Employment Equity, above n 4, at 15; Hyman and Clark Equal Pay Study: Phase One  
Report (Department of Labour, 1987) at 6; John Pask Submission on the Report of the Working 
Group on Equal Employment Opportunities and Equal Pay “Towards Employment Equity” 
(Economic Development Commission, October 1987) at 23. 
72  Terranova v SFWU, above n 6, at [177]. 
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including reports and parliamentary debates. This is hardly surprising for two key reasons. 
First, the main purposive aids set out in the accepted method of statutory interpretation did 
not exist at the passage of the Equal Pay Act 1972. Purpose provisions and explanatory 
notes have been a comparatively recent development. In their place the Long Title does 
little to speak to the distinction at issue in this case.73 Second, extrinsic contextual aids, 
particularly legislative history materials, are closely connected with purpose. While the 
accepted method of statutory interpretation draws a line between the two, the two concepts 
are not mutually exclusive.74 The extrinsic aids can be relevant to both purposive and 
contextual inquiries. A degree of overlap exists between the inquiries. 
 
3 Values 
 
The Court gave considerable focus to New Zealand’s international obligations, particularly 
under the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Convention Concerning Equal 
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers of Equal Value.75 This convention requires 
signatories to provide for equal pay including for work of equal value.76 Pay equity clearly 
comes under the ambit of this instrument. The focus on the international dimension was in 
response to the Employment Court’s decision that placed considerably more emphasis on 
these obligations than required.77 The Court took a more restricted view on the relevance 
of the international context to the interpretation of the statute.78 
The Court of Appeal was right to draw little interpretive help from New Zealand’s 
ratification of the convention. Parliament waited to ratify the convention until after the 
enactment of the Equal Pay Act in 1983. The Equal Pay Act is the most likely piece of 
legislation in existence at the time to fulfil this requirement. However, there is little 
evidence to suggest the Act was passed to ensure compliance.79 Furthermore, if New 
Zealand had legislated solely for pay equality in 1972 this would not be inconsistent with 
the ILO Convention. Both narrow and wide conceptions are consistent with the 
Convention. A narrow view would simply represent a partial implementation of the 
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requirements.  However, the limits of this argument need to be acknowledged. There is 
little evidence to link the Act with ratification. 
 
4 The findings on interpretation 
 
The Court decided on balance that the textual, purposive, contextual and value factors 
weighed in favour of the Act providing for pay equity.80 The Court did acknowledge this 
was a finely weighted decision.81  In no area was there a clear, or even persuasive, reason 
to adopt a particular meaning. The text is the strongest of all factors and yet it fails to make 
any clear demarcations. 
This analysis of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning does not show any great divergence with 
the generally accepted method. The differences are relatively minor and their impact 
minimal. However, while the reasoning is similar, the conclusions reached by the Court 
and this paper are significantly different. It is my assertion that an exercise in statutory 
interpretation does not provide a satisfactory answer. The majority of the investigation is 
characterised by the materials failing to engage with the ambiguity. Those that do provide 
such weak arguments it is difficult to justify a balancing exercise. Despite the attempted 
interpretation the scope of the Act remains unclear. The question of the inclusion or 
exclusion of pay equity remains unanswered. 
A possible explanation of the divergence in conclusions can be seen when viewing the 
Court of Appeal’s decision through a lens of legal realism. Legal realism refutes the claim 
that legal reasoning is an autonomous process guided solely by law.82 Instead it looks to 
social and political factors that impact on the outcome. With the failing of the interpretive 
exercise the Court was left with a policy choice between two options: providing for pay 
equity under the Act, or not. The decision to include pay equity was an unarticulated 
policy decision.  
While statutory interpretation is not the focus of this paper, the application of the accepted 
approach to interpretation has identified some inadequacies within the orthodoxy. In 
particular the debate surrounding parliamentary intention remains an active source of 
discussion. The relevance of departmental documents and consideration of subsequent 
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occurrences are ways in which the orthodox approach could be strengthened.  However, 
this has not impeded the ability of the courts to adopt a purposive approach. Using the 
language of ‘purpose’ as opposed to ‘parliamentary intent’ has insulated the debate to 
some degree. Purpose is simply stated as what Parliament was trying to achieve.83 
 
IV Continuing the Path to Equity 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision has made it possible to litigate pay equity claims under the 
Equal Pay Act. There are two ways litigation could be used to achieve pay equity. First, 
litigation is traditionally conceived as two parties seeking judicial resolution of the 
relevant dispute. The claimants would be asking the Court to provide judgment, create 
precedent and hear future claims on a case by case basis. Alternately, the court action 
could also be used for strategic positioning. The possibility of an unfavourable judicial 
ruling creates pressure to resolve the issue through settlement. However, each of these 
approaches exhibits some degree of ineptitude in providing a desirable solution. Alternate 
avenues remain open outside of the courts. An unregulated market and a legislative 
response also potentially have the capacity to provide an equitable pay result. Considering 
litigation and the alternate methods leads to a wider discussion about what is the 
appropriate avenue for achieving equity. This is a normative inquiry. It asks what path is 
the most effective in reaching the desired outcome. I will argue that a legislative response 
would be the most desirable progression in achieving pay equity.  
 
A Litigation 
 
As established there are two ways litigation could be used to achieve a solution favourable 
to pay equity. First, litigation could be used to create precedent for future claims. In this 
way the judicial verdict would provide the solution. It would be resolution by litigation. 
Second, litigation could be used strategically to pressure an extrajudicial agreement. This 
would be resolution by strategic litigation.  
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1 Resolution by litigation 
 
By making these applications Ms Bartlett and the Union are effectively asking the Court to 
create precedent for pay equity under the Act. The Court is being asked to resolve the 
current dispute and create precedent for future claims to be brought. Litigation provides 
the solution. The Employment Court recognised it was deciding on a novel point of law.84 
However, there are strong arguments against courts attempting to cater for pay equity. 
One reason the courts may not be the preferred avenue for addressing pay equity is the 
inherent practical difficulties in addressing the highly complex issue. If the current 
proceedings were to continue there are three key areas that may prove challenging. These 
areas are finding a comparator group, establishing causation and obtaining guidance from 
the courts.  
(a)  Finding a comparator group 
 
First, a comparator group to the claimant would need to be identified.85 Comparator groups 
are used where it is deemed inappropriate to gather evidence from within the female-
dominated industry. It appears that comparator groups will largely be used where the claim 
is of systemic undervaluation of the entire industry. Comparator groups represent work of 
equal value and would be used as evidence of what would be paid to a man in the 
claimant’s position. The Court of Appeal stopped short of giving detailed directions about 
how to find such a group in the preliminary hearing but the need for such a group is 
addressed generally.86 The Court of Appeal referred to tools that are used to calculate the 
size of a job.87 These are known as job evaluation systems. Job evaluation systems weigh 
up a variety of factors to measure the magnitude of the work. These factors include 
knowledge needed, physical exertion, emotional demands and working conditions. The 
Department of Labour devised an equitable job evaluation tool, known as the EJE, for the 
express purpose of removing any gender-based discriminatory assumptions and biases 
when assessing a job.88 However, the EJE is not the only tool available. Other tools 
include a Position Analysis Questionnaire and a non-analytical system.89 These tools 
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89  Robert Madigan and David Hoover “Effects of Alternative Job Evaluation Methods on Decisions  
19 
 
approach the task of assessing a job in different ways. Factors deemed relevant change 
depending on the system in place. An empirical investigation was carried out examining 
various tools used within the United States. It acknowledged the difficulties that arise 
when equitable evaluation tools are not regulated, “because universal norms of worth do 
not exist, the concept of worth incorporated in different job evaluation plans is likely to 
vary.”90 Their study showed that the size of job, relative to another, was likely to be a 
reflection of the particular tool used. This is a highly undesirable outcome. Justice will not 
be seen to be done if the result is dependent on procedural matters and not the existing 
discrimination. 
Of course this difficulty could be overcome if a single system was adopted. In a 2009 
report by the Department of Labour it appears the EJE is still favoured.91 The Department 
acknowledged that a review of the tool’s usability would need to be carried out. While this 
review did take place there was no detailed conclusion on the usability point.92 It was 
acknowledged that the tool has been used infrequently at best but there was no discussion 
about the reasons for this. 
 
(b)  Causation 
 
The comparator group, once found, is evidence of what men would be paid to perform the 
same work as the claimant. However, any differences in two groups that carry out work of 
equal value are not necessarily the product of gender discrimination. This is the inherent 
difficulty in treating unlike as like. This was not discussed in the Court of Appeal decision, 
but it is not necessarily an omission in a preliminary hearing. It is more likely to be 
considered during factual determination. However, causation will be a relevant 
consideration at that stage. The difference in pay must be caused by gender discrimination. 
Wages in an industry are the result of a variety of factors. The value of the work alone is 
not determinative. Empirical evidence shows that good performance by an industry has a 
direct impact on wage levels.93 High demand within an industry can also inflate wages. 
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This has been evident in the construction sector during the Christchurch rebuild.94 
Furthermore, the funding structure of an industry can be of influence. In the aged-care 
sector, the focus of the current litigation, there is a difference in the rate of remuneration 
between what is paid to aged-carers carrying out their roles in public hospitals and carers 
carrying out the same tasks in private rest-homes receiving government subsidies.95 These 
various influences demonstrate that the quantum of a wage is more than the sum total of 
the value of the work.  
These factors impact on the rate of remuneration but in no way are attributable to gender 
discrimination. If causation is not required when assessing comparator groups then the 
claimant group is effectively being saddled with an advantages or disadvantages of the 
comparator industry. However, if the claim if brought under the Equal Pay Act it is clear 
causation must be established. The Act is limited to providing for non-discriminatory pay 
as defined in s 2.96 This highlights that wages can only be corrected to the extent that 
discrimination is responsible. 
Causation in this context is difficult to prove. The 1971 Commission of Inquiry 
acknowledged that, “to put the point simply, pay rates are not based solely on equal job 
content or on equal value of what is done.”97 In each new factual scenario, it will require a 
comprehensive investigation. It will be necessary to determine which part of the 
comparator’s wage reflects the value of the work and which is the result of other factors. It 
is also not clear if a positive causal link is necessary. It may be enough that there is an 
unexplained discrepancy in rate of remuneration. 
 
(c) Guidance 
 
The Court of Appeal has recommended that the next step in the current proceedings is for 
the Employment Court to provide a statement of principles under s 9 of the Act.98 Section 
9 allows the Court to state general principles for the implementation of equal pay.99 
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However, from the potential practical problems, arising from first trying to find a 
comparator and then prove causation, it appears more detailed directions may be needed. 
In the United Kingdom the Employment Tribunal was able to give such precise 
instructions in Hartley v Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust.100 This 2009 
decision provided in-depth guidance on pay evaluation systems. Without a similar level of 
judicial direction as to the appropriate job evaluation tool procedural inconsistencies are 
likely to result in the New Zealand jurisdiction. Causation is such a complex investigation 
that parameters would be useful to limit the scope of inquiry. 
While this detailed direction would undeniably be helpful in pay equity cases brought 
under the Act, it seems to fall outside the power given in s 9. There is a tension between 
the detailed direction needed and the general power given. Fitting the required detailed 
framework within s 9 seems to be stretching that provision beyond its capabilities. The 
1975 Progress of Equal Pay in New Zealand report acknowledged the need for further 
guidance.101 However, s 9 was not identified as the appropriate method of supplying these 
guidelines. Instead of the courts, it was seen as the purview of the government.102 
While none of these practical difficulties are insurmountable, it does highlight significant 
practical difficulties in trying to achieve an equitable result through litigation. There is the 
potential for the claimant to be saddled with an onerous burden, or the courts with a 
cumbersome task, in identifying a comparator and causal link. It does not appear that the 
Court is able to mitigate these difficulties by providing an appropriate level of direction. 
Furthermore, from a utilitarian perspective there is little evidence to show that litigation is 
able to solve the wider problem of pay equity. In no country monitored by the OECD has 
pay inequity been completely eliminated.103 Countries such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom that hear pay equity claims in the courts have not seen any meaningful 
change in pay gap statistics.104 Evidence in the United States shows that the majority of 
progress has been made through industry-led deals and legislation.105 When the difficulties 
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of judicially prescribed pay equity are viewed in light of the expected outcome it becomes 
a less attractive option. 
Creating a case by case approach to pay equity also has the disadvantage of increasing 
work load of the courts. The scope for pay equity claims in New Zealand may be wide 
reaching. The Chief Executive of the New Zealand Aged Care Association views pay 
equity as impacting the New Zealand workforce in its entirety.106 The efficiency of 
engaging in a case by case system is a further detractor of resolution by litigation.  
 
2 Resolution by strategic litigation 
 
In Terranova the claimants could use litigation to place pressure on the aged care sector to 
resolve the dispute extra-judicially. The unknown nature of a judicial finding and 
inconveniences of the litigation process can create pressure to reach a settlement. This is 
known as strategic litigation. The current proceedings have been openly acknowledged as 
a test case.107 Ms Bartlett and the union are trying to achieve pay equity and are testing to 
see if the existing legislation is capable of providing this. There is also the potential for the 
positive ruling in the Court of Appeal to be used outside of the courts in the commercial 
sector. Litigation, or the threat of it, can be used to change behaviour within the 
commercial sector. McCann explains how this has been used in the pay equity context: 108 
The principal contribution of courts if the provision of a background of norms and 
procedures, against which negotiations and regulations in both private and governmental 
setting takes place. The character of these effects thus has very little to do with judicial 
policy competence or enforcement capacity, and very much more to do with the tactical 
designs, skills, and resources of citizens deploying judicial endowments to gain position in 
social venues often far removed from the courts.  
Thus industries may wish to take proactive steps when the courts have declared pay equity 
is provided for under the Act. The decision can also be used as a point of leverage in 
negotiations between industries and employees or the representative unions. The desired 
outcome, pay equity, may be furthered without following the full legal procedure. Harlow 
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and Rawlings have focussed on this idea of proactive strategic litigation.109 This tactic is 
used by actors and interest groups wishing to bringing about change. It has been frequently 
employed particularly in the European and American jurisdictions.110 Actors within New 
Zealand such as employee unions and CEVEP, Campaign for Equal Value, Equal Pay, 
certainly fit the description of an interest group. Their aim is to protect anti-discrimination 
rights by ensuring pay equity exists. It may be that the pressure generated by the current 
litigation is the most effective means of achieving their end goal. 
While the pressure created by litigation may provide a solution in relation to this claim, the 
limits of this method must be recognised. Settlements and other agreements reached 
through strategic litigation do not enjoy the ability to create a precedent for future claims. 
The problem of pay equity would not be conclusively solved but subdued in this scenario.  
 
B The Market 
 
Critics of judicial and legislative steps argue an unfettered market will correct the current 
disparity.111 This argument is based on free-market ideology. Equity will be the by-product 
of a market free from union pressure and judicial and legislative constraints. Indeed the 
1971 report from the Commission on Inquiry recommended that imposing any broad 
scheme should be avoided.112 It was felt any universally applicable scheme was not 
desirable because of the inherent practical difficulties. Instead it was deemed that industry 
and the private sector was capable of making progress.113 Realistic appraisals of job worth 
during employment negotiations could achieve pay equity. Those within an industry are 
best placed to identify and weigh the various factors that affect pay. 
There are several factors that cast a doubtful shadow over these claims. First, Melvin 
argues that even a market free from formal constraints is still subject to the underlying 
biases and assumptions of society.114 In this way the ingrained social attitudes that create 
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systemic gender discrimination will be perpetuated, albeit unconsciously, by the market.115 
History has shown that government intervention has been necessary to mitigate the effects 
of discrimination left untouched by the market.116 Second, there have been few formal 
requirements placed upon the market in relation to pay equity in New Zealand. The broad 
power under the Equal Pay Act has not been acknowledged until the current litigation.117 
Despite this prolonged period of freedom there has been no significant correction in the 
market. The pay gap has remained largely unchanged for over a decade. It therefore seems 
an unfettered market is not the appropriate avenue for pay equity. Some form of 
intervention is necessary. 
 
C Legislation 
 
A third way that equity could be provided for is with legislation. Even if equity fits within 
the Equal Pay Act there is arguably room for a dedicated statute that sets out more defined 
parameters. Government reports from 1975 and 1987 have recommended the 
implementation of pay equity legislation.118 
For a short period of time New Zealand did have such legislation. The Employment Equity 
Act was enacted in 1990. The purpose of the Act was to establish procedures for achieving 
pay equity.119 It created a statutory officer to oversee the implementation of pay equity and 
provided the machinery needed to do so.120 Claims were to be lodged with the 
Commissioner for assessment. However, one of the Act’s strengths was not its longevity. 
Within a year it was repealed by the incoming National Government. It was repealed due 
to different political ideologies regarding regulation of employment. 
Enacting legislation similar to this is a strong option to be considered. The continuing 
existence of the 1990 Act would render the current proceedings void. Pay equity would 
clearly be provided for. There are a variety of forms this new legislation could take. A 
revival of the 1990 regime is one these options. Changes in the employment context since 
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1990 necessitate some changes to the original Act. The way in which employment 
agreements are conducted has moved on.121 Awards are no longer used and collective 
bargaining is not so pervasive. Instead individual employment contracts have come into 
vogue. Consequently Melvin recommends provision in any future statute is made to allow 
individuals to bring claims on their own behalf.122 
There are inherent advantages in dedicated legislation. In this paper I argue it is the most 
desirable method of providing for pay equity. It is able to address the issue with a 
sufficient degree of detail. The ability to establish a framework is a key reason why this 
path is to be preferred over a general statement by the courts under s 9. Legislation would 
also remove the need for interest groups to lobby and pursue strategic litigation in the 
future. Instead these groups and individuals would be provided with a firm foundation 
upon which to demand equitable payment. Legislation provides an end solution, removing 
the continuing uncertainty produced by market and strategic litigation methods. As well as 
being a highly desirable outcome, a legislative response may also be a more likely 
response. In the current case government interests are directly affected as a major funder of 
the aged care sector. There have been signals that the Government is considering taking 
such a step.123 
 
V Conclusion 
 
The issue of pay equity is far from straightforward. Pay equity claims often involve 
complex evidence and nuanced arguments. To aid with this process, a straightforward 
statutory scheme is highly desirable. However, the Equal Pay Act 1972 does not provide 
this particular framework. Interpretation of the statute shows the scope of the Act is not 
clearly delineated. It is not readily apparent if the Act is limited to providing for pay 
equality or if it can extend to pay equity. In Terranova v Service and Food Workers Union 
the Court of Appeal found that the wider meaning was permissible. While this is an open 
interpretation, the finding is better seen as a result of a policy decision by the Court as 
opposed to the outcome of statutory interpretation.  
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The Court of Appeal’s decision has made it possible to litigate pay equity claims under the 
Equal Pay Act. However, proceeding with the claim for pay equity under the Act 
highlights wider normative questions that arise when dealing with pay equity. Resolution 
through litigation is impeded by practical difficulties. The general power in the Act does 
not give, or allow for, the required specificity of direction needed in these complex claims. 
Other avenues for addressing pay equity are open. These are strategic litigation, a 
legislative response and an unregulated market. The most desirable path open is that of 
legislation. It is able to give clear, precise direction, cutting across any unconscious social 
biases. 
Equality between genders is a protected right. It is a right the law has recognised and 
protected in a broad sense.124 Pay inequity remains as a source of discriminatory disparity 
between genders. Pay equity deserves clear protection, best provided for in legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The text of this paper excluding the bibliography, appendices, cover page, contents page 
and footnote citations is exactly 7999 words. 
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VI Appendix One 
 
Question 1  
In determining whether there is an element of differentiation in the rate of remuneration 
paid to a female employee for her work, based on her sex, do the criteria identified in s 
3(1)(b) of the Equal Pay Act require the Court to:  
(a) Identify the rate of remuneration that would be paid if the work were not work 
exclusively or predominantly performed by females, by comparing the actual rate 
paid with a notional rate that would be paid were it not for that fact; or  
(b) Identify the rate that her employer would pay a male employee if it employed 
one to perform the work?  
Answer: Section 3(1)(b) requires that equal pay for women for work predominantly or 
exclusively performed by women, is to be determined by reference to what men would be 
paid to do the same work abstracting from skills, responsibility, conditions and degrees of 
effort as well as from any systemic undervaluation of the work derived from current or 
historical or structural gender discrimination. 
 
Question 6  
In considering the s 3(1)(b) issue of “…the rate of remuneration that would be paid to male 
employees with the same, or substantially similar, skills, responsibility, and service, 
performing the work under the same, or substantially similar, conditions and with the same 
or substantially similar, degrees of effort”, is the Authority or Court entitled to have regard 
to what is paid to males in other industries?  
Answer: They may be if those enquiries of other employees of the same employer or of 
other employers in the same or similar enterprise or industry or sector would be an 
inappropriate comparator group. 
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VII Appendix Two 
 
Equal Pay Act 1972, s 3 
3 Criteria to be applied 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, in determining whether there 
exists an element of differentiation, based on the sex of the employees, in the 
rates of remuneration of male employees and female employees for any work 
or class of work payable under any instrument, and for the purpose of making 
the determinations specified in subsection (1) of section 4, the following 
criteria shall apply: 
(a) for work which is not exclusively or predominantly performed by 
female employees— 
(i) the extent to which the work or class of work calls for the 
same, or substantially similar, degrees of skill, effort, and 
responsibility; and 
(ii) the extent to which the conditions under which the work is to 
be performed are the same or substantially similar: 
(b) for work which is exclusively or predominantly performed by 
female employees, the rate of remuneration that would be paid to male 
employees with the same, or substantially similar, skills, 
responsibility, and service performing the work under the same, or 
substantially similar, conditions and with the same, or substantially 
similar, degrees of effort. 
(2) In determining whether there exists an element of differentiation, based 
on the sex of the employees, in the rates of remuneration for male 
employees and female employees for any work or class of work, no 
account shall be taken of any provision in any Act or Order in Council 
which limits the work female employees may perform. 
(3) Subject to any such provision in any Act or Order in Council and to 
sections 4 to 8, no instrument coming into force after 31 March 1973 shall 
contain classifications of work that differentiate, on the basis of the sex of 
the employees, in the work which male employees or female employees 
may perform. 
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